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The Tax Status of Voluntary
Payments to Widows of Employees
By MARION KERN CHARLES
Philadelphia Chapter, A.S.W.A.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 has
provided a new battleground upon which
to pursue the contest on the old question—
“When is a gift not a gift for income tax
purposes?” Voluntary payments made by an
employer to the widow of a deceased employee
fall within the scope of this question.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue con
sistently held, under the 1939 Code, that such
payments were not tax-free gifts but repre
sented compensation for past services rendered
by the employee. As such, they were taxable
to the recipient. Confronted with the widow’s
“might,” however, he enjoyed but infrequent
success in sustaining his position when the
widow appealed to the courts.
Benevolent employers, on the other hand,
are faced with another tax problem. If such
payments are, in fact, gifts, do they constitute
a valid deduction for corporate income tax
purposes? This factor bears particular scrutiny
where the deceased employee or his widow,
either as heir or in her own right, owns a
controlling stock interest.
Regulation Section 23(a)9 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939 provided as follows:
“When the amount of the salary of an
officer or employee is paid for a limited
period after his death to his widow or heirs,
in recognition of the services rendered by
the individual, such payments may be de
ducted.”
No similar provision appears in the corres
ponding Regulation (Section 162-trade or
business expenses) of the 1954 Code but in
Regulation Section 1.404(a)-12, relating to
contributions to employee deferred compensa
tion plans it is provided:
“...... if amounts are paid as a death
benefit to the beneficiaries of an employee
(for example, by continuing his salary for
a reasonable period), and if such amounts
meet the requirements of Section 162...,
such amounts are deductible under Section
404(a) (5) in any case when they are not
deductible under the other paragraphs of
Section 404(a).”
The Commissioner specifically ruled on this
point in Revenue Ruling 54-625, 1954-2
CB 85.
“When a corporation on the accrual basis
of accounting obliges itself to pay to the

widow of a deceased employee in periodic
installments over a period of years, an
amount representing reasonable compensa
tion to the deceased employee in recogni
tion of past services rendered by such
employee, such amount is generally de
ductible .............. as a business expense for
the year in which such liability is incurred.”
The above ruling subsequently was modi
fied by Revenue Ruling 55-212, 1955-1 CB
299, to the extent that the employer may
deduct in each year only those amounts which
are actually paid during the year, subject to
the tests of reasonableness.
There is no express definition of the term
“limited period” but the Commissioner has
ruled and the courts have held that it should be
construed as a measure of the reasonableness
of the amounts to be paid rather than merely
stating a time limitation for their payment.
Thus a “reasonable amount” may be spread
over as long a period of time as the employer
may consider practicable. The reasonableness
of amount depends upon the facts of each
particular case but it is current I. R. S. policy
to accept as a reasonable deduction an amount
not in excess of two years compensation. This
is not an inflexible rule but it does provide
employers with a yardstick by which to gauge
the extent to which their generosity may be
expressed without penalty.
With regard to the taxability of the pay
ments to the widow, 1954 Code Section
101(b) provides for the exclusion from gross
income by the recipient of payments not in
excess of $5,000. received from a deceased
employee’s employer by reason of the death of
the employee. This exclusion applies whether
or not it is made pursuant to a contract and
whether it is paid in a single sum or in install
ments. It is not limited to amounts received in
a single year, therefore the exclusion is not
lost where the first $5,000. of payments is
spread over two or more years.
The $5,000. exclusion does not apply to
amounts constituting income payable to the
employee during his life as compensation for
services, nor to other amounts to which the
deceased employee possessed a nonforfeitable
right at the time of his death. The total
amount excludable with respect to any em
ployee may not exceed $5,000., regardless of
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The Commissioner finally surrendered his
position on August 25, 1958, by issuing Tech
nical Information Release No. 87 which stated:
“In view of a number of adverse court
decisions in cases involving voluntary pay
ments to widows by their deceased hus
band’s employers, the Internal Revenue
Service today announced that it will no
longer litigate, under the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939, cases involving the taxability
of such payments unless there is clear evi
dence that they were intended as compensa
tion for services, or where the payments may
be considered as dividends.”
The Release emphasized that it represented
litigation policy applicable to 1939 Code cases
only and that the position of the Service with
respect to the 1954 Code will be the subject
of a future announcement. There are indica
tions that the Commissioner will adopt a narrow
interpretation of 1954 Code Section 101(b) in
line with the dicta in the Rodner case to be
discussed later.
The most significant provision of 1954 Code
Section 101(b) is the exclusion from gross in
come of voluntary employee death benefits up
to but not in excess of $5,000. It would
appear, at first glance, that all such voluntary
payments in excess of $5,000. would be taxa
ble to the widow (if the employee died after
August 16, 1954, the effective date of the 1954
Code). An analysis of the recommended
changes to be made by Section 101(b) in the
Report of the House Ways and Means Com
mittee on H.R.8300, however, indicates that
the intention was to liberalize the law on such
payments and not to subject to tax those pay
ments which had heretofore been held to be
nontaxable gifts.
The Report stated in part:
“Restricting the exemption to benefits paid
under a contract discriminates against those
who receive benefits where this contractual
obligation does not exist. To avoid this
problem your committee’s bill extends this
exclusion to death benefits whether or not
paid under a contract.”
Nowhere in the explanation pertaining to
recommended changes does the committee
refer to the tax treatment of the excess over
$5,000. It is difficult to believe that Congress
was unaware that the courts have consistently
ignored or rejected I.T.4027 and have held
voluntary payments to widows to be taxfree gifts under 1939 Code Section 22(b)(3). The committee’s very silence on this
point would seem to imply that no change
was intended to be made in their tax-free
status.
If Congress intended that a change be
made it could have specifically provided that

the number of employers or the number of
beneficiaries.
Section 22(b)(1) of the 1939 Code pro
vided for a similar $5,000. exclusion if the
payments received were pursuant to a con
tract. It also permitted the exclusion of $5,000.
per employer. Thus, if the deceased had more
than one employer, the beneficiaries could
collectively receive $5,000. tax-free from each
employer.
The tax treatment applicable to benefits in
excess of $5,000. can be much more important
than the treatment of only the first $5,000.
Herein lies the controversy.
The Commissioner’s regulations have pro
vided since 1920 (Regulation 45, Article 32)
that “so-called pensions awarded by one to
whom no services have been rendered are
mere gifts or gratuities and are not taxable.”
The Treasury Department, in years prior to
1949, specifically ruled that voluntary pay
ments by employers to widows of deceased
employees were gifts or gratuities and, al
though deductible by the payer were not
taxable in the hands of the recipient. The
first such ruling (T.D.2090) was issued in
1914. It was reaffirmed in 1921 by O.D.1017,
5 CB 101, and again in 1939 by I.T. 3329,
1939-2 CB 153.
In 1950 the Commissioner reversed his posi
tion and issued I.T.4027, 1950-2 CB 9, which
reads:
“It is the position of the Bureau that ir
respective of a 'plan,’ voluntary or involun
tary, definite or indefinite, payments of the
type herein considered constitute taxable
income, and it is held that payments made
by an employer to the widow of a deceased
officer, or employee, in consideration of
services rendered by the officer or employee,
are includable in the gross income of the
widow for Federal income tax purposes.”
(Applicable to payments received after
January 1, 1951.)
The Commissioner has consistently followed
I.T.4027 with respect to all such death bene
fits since January 1, 1951. Where the widow
has appealed to the courts, they have rather
consistently held for the widow. In various
cases examined where payments were re
ceived after January 1, 1951, those that were
strictly voluntary payments with no previous
plan, contract or agreement and where the
widow rendered no services, the Tax Court
and five different district courts held such
payments to be gifts under 1949 Code Section
22(b)(3). In every case the Commissioner
failed to acquiesce which resulted in the con
tinued taxation of such gratuitous payments
wherever the Commissioner’s action was not
contested.
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voluntary payments to the widow of a de
ceased employee were not gifts at all, but by
legislative grace it was granting an exclusion
to the first $5,000. thereof. As an alternative
it could have provided for the taxability of
such payments by specifically including re
ference to the excess of over $5,000. in Part II
of Sub-chapter B of Chapter 1 of the 1954
Code entitled “Items Specifically Included in
Gross Income.” It could also have inserted a
specific exclusion in the Code Section pro
viding for the tax-free status of gifts.
This section which appeared as Section
22(b)(3) of the 1939 Code has been carried
over without substantial change to become
Section 102 of the 1954 Code and states:
“Gross income does not include the value
of property acquired by gift, bequest, de
vise or inheritance.”
The U.S. Supreme Court explored the area
of “gift versus taxable income” in the fre
quently cited case of Bogardus v. Commis
sioner (37-2 USTC 9534). A pertinent part
of the majority opinion follows:
“The statute definitely distinguishes be
tween compensation on the one hand and
gifts on the other hand; the former being
taxable and the latter free from taxation.
The two terms are, and were meant to be,
mutually exclusive; and a bestowal of
money cannot, under the statute, be both a
gift and a payment of compensation............
“If the sum of money under consideration
was a gift and not compensation, it is
exempt from taxation and cannot be made
taxable by resort to any form of sub-classi
fication. If it be in fact a gift, that is the
end of the matter; and inquiry whether it
is a gift of one sort or another is irrelevant.
This is necessarily true, for since all gifts
are made nontaxable, there can be no such
thing under the statute as a taxable gift. . .”
(italics supplied).
Both the majority and minority opinions
in this case were in agreement that the deter
minative question was the intention which
predominated in the minds of the persons
making or ordering the payment. In most of
the death benefit cases reviewed in making
this analysis, the courts placed particular
emphasis upon the “intent” factor.
In Rodner v. U.S., 57-1 USTC, 149 F.
Supp. 233, the Federal District Court (New
York) cited and completely rejected LT. 4027
holding that the voluntary payments involved
were gifts to the widow. The court expressed
the following opinion with respect to the
effect of the 1954 Code on such payments:
“The Internal Revenue Code of 1954
(not applicable here) changed this. Sec

tion 101(b), 68A Stat. 26,................... eli
minates the provisions limiting to contrac
tual death benefits the application of the
$5,000. exemption. To me the effect of this
would seem to be to withdraw the com
plete exemption that gratuitous death
benefits had enjoyed and to substitute an
exemption up to $5,000. In the complete
revision effected by the 1954 Code the
general language exempting gifts is con
trolled by the particular language of Sec
tion 101(b) limiting the exemption of
death benefits to $5,000. Gifts in general
are exempt but gifts in the form of death
benefits are taxable insofar as they exceed
$5,000.”
The Rodner theory implies that Section 102
and Section 101 must be read together and
that Section 102 is amended by implication.
This theory is open to question. It would
seem that if an amendment to Section 102
were intended by Section 101 as of the date
of enactment it would have been made either
specifically or by cross reference.
The Rodner case was cited in Bounds v. U.S.,
59-1 USTC 9159, in which it was held that
payments to an employee’s widow in 1952
were gifts under the 1939 Code. The Fourth
Circuit took the following position in a foot
note:
“While this controversy arises under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, the law has
now been amended and the problem with
which we are here concerned cannot arise
in the future. The new law [1954 Code
Sec. 101(b)] rejects the tests which have
been found unsatisfactory in practice and
unequivocally makes nontaxable payments
to the employee’s estate or family, made
by reason of his death, but it imposes a
$5,000. limitation.”
This was not the conclusion of the Fed
eral District Court (Kentucky) in Reed v.
U.S., 3 AFTR 2d, 719, which we believe to be
the first case decided under the 1954 Code
provisions.
In this case the corporate employer of a
widow’s husband paid the widow $50,000.
(an amount equal to the husband’s annual
salary) in twelve installments. The payments
were made “as a material expression of sym
pathy and of kindness” and were “motivated by
a deep sense of appreciation and recognition
of the past services” of the husband, according
to a resolution adopted by the employer’s
board of directors.
The court found that the husband had been
fully compensated for services he had ren
dered as chief executive officer of the em
ployer. The payments made to the widow
5

the Reed case or limited views expressed in
the dicta of Rodner and Rounds. Even though
the majority of the courts decide adversely
to the Commissioner’s position it is to be ex
pected that he will again adopt a policy of
non-acquiescence, giving taxpayers no alter
natives but to litigate or pay the tax.
In these cases, careful tax planning is im
portant. A successful conclusion to legal
action, from the taxpayer’s standpoint, may
depend upon the very inception of the death
benefits, that is, upon the corporate resolu
tion authorizing their payment. The wording
of the resolution should clearly express the
intention of the Board of Directors to make
a voluntary gift. There should be no inference
that there exists either the element of de
ferred compensation or obligation on the part
of the employer.
Where a majority stockholder is involved,
the company would do well to maintain the
status quo as to dividend policy. Although in
the cases reviewed no great significance
seemed to be placed upon stockholdings by
the courts, any downward trend in the ratio
of dividends to earnings, unless supported by
other factors, could lend weight to the argu
ment that the death benefits are dividends in
disguise.
Where the amount of tax involved war
rants the expense of litigation, court action
would appear to be justified. However, until
such time as a sufficient number of cases have
been decided under the 1954 Code to estab
lish a judicial pattern, prudence dictates pay
ment of the tax and the subsequent filing of a
claim for refund. This procedure protects the
widow from a possible liability for interest
on a potential tax deficiency.

were not made in consideration of, or as
additional compensation for, any services
rendered to the employer by the husband. The
court also found that they were not made
under any obligation owed by the employer
to the husband, his estate, or the widow. It
concluded that the payments were nontaxable
gifts which were not subject to the $5,000.
exclusion provided by 1954 Code Section
101(b).
The court stated, in part:
“Section 102(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 contains the provision (as
did the comparable Section 22(b)(3), of
the 1939 Code) that gross income does not
include amounts received as gifts; and the
meaning of that provision is not changed by
the provisions of Section 101(b) of the
1954 Code.
“It is clear that the purpose of the latter
Section of the 1954 Code is to eliminate
the requirement (contained in the com
parable Section, 22(b)(2), of the 1939
Code) that certain employee death benefits
must be paid pursuant to a contractual
obligation in order for such benefits to
qualify for a $5,000. exclusion from gross
income. No part of the aforesaid gift..........
is, by reason of Section 101(b), includable
in taxable income, and such gift is not
subject to the limitation of the $5,000. ex
clusion provided in that Section.”
The Commissioner contested this decision
and the case is now on appeal to the Sixth
Circuit.
There are numerous similar cases pending
at various levels of the Internal Revenue Ser
vice. It remains to be seen whether the courts
will follow the liberal conclusion reached in
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